Rationality is an evolved strategy, aiming for success within an evolutionary environment.
But we also aim for better success rates at a second level,
Rationality’s
explicit Articulation and
critical examination. When we consciously scrutinise and adapt our
conception of rationality as it guides our judgements, i.e. as a
normative conception, we also do so “in response to practical
needs”.Ismael (2013), 90
When we articulate, evaluate and modify our normative conception of rationality in order to increase our chances for success, we work towards a reflective equilibrium – a balance between principles and principled arguments on one side and intuitions and concrete cases on the other:
We modify the theories accordingly until theories and data fit together—though it is not always the theories which are adjusted to the data [i. e. individual or paradigmatic cases]; it can also be the other way round.Spohn (2002), 257
Reaching this equilibrium is a mark of rationality itself – there are
no good reasons to change our account anymore, neither arguments nor
intuitions. We have reached the most reasonable position. Of course,
a reflective equilibrium is always only temporary. “And so the
normative discourse develops, ramifies, and becomes more and more
sophisticated.”ibid.
When building a unified
Theory of
rationality, this equilibrium has to be reached not only within, but
between the normative and the empirical parts of the theory: “We
deal with quite a complex two-fold reflective equilibrium of theory
formation.”ibid., 261
As with every scientific endeavour, the normative conception of
rationality guides empirical psychological research. But sometimes the
normative account has to be corrected due to the development of the
empirical theory: We will have to give up normative demands that are
systematically not fulfilled in “real life” if we want to satisfy
Donald Davidson’s
coherence criterion.That we need to assume “a large degree of rationality”
of our belief system. (Davidson 1982, 99)
This also reflects the fact that A theory of rationality articulates practices.
References
- Davidson (1982): “Rational Animals”, in: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
- Ismael (2013): “Naturalism on the Sydney Plan”
- Spohn (2002): “The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality”